General vs. Specific Intent: A Time for Terminological Understanding in California by Roth, William
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 3
12-15-1979
General vs. Specific Intent: A Time for
Terminological Understanding in California
William Roth
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
William Roth General vs. Specific Intent: A Time for Terminological Understanding in California, 7 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (1980)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/3
General vs. Specific Intent: A Time
for Terminological Understanding
in California
WILLIAM ROTH*
Use of the terms "general intent" and "specific intent" are a continuing
source of confusion in criminal law. The meanings are amorphous and
serve little purpose. Professor Roth would prefer that their use be discon-
tinued. Since this seems unlikely, he attempts to clarify the concepts by
approaching the definitional problem from two perspectives: a vertical
model differentiating on the degree of culpability, and a horizontal model
differentiating present and future intent. The author then critically ana-
lyzes application of the intent concept to specific issues. He suggests that
the rule wherein intoxication may be a defense to specific intent crimes,
but not to general intent crimes, is unsound. The relevancy of evidence of
intoxication is not directly affected by labeling a crime one of general or
specific intent. This rule has resulted in the fiction that assault is a general
intent crime. Professor Roth suggests the label attached to a crime should
not determine the admissibility of evidence, and that assault should be rec-
ognized as a crime of specific intent which public policy demands not be
defensible on the grounds of intoxication.
INTRODUCTION
Among the numerous perplexing issues in criminal law, the
problem of "intent" continues to puzzle many able judges and
practitioners. In an effort to understand this concept, they often
* B.A. 1964, University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D. 1967, University of
California, Los Angeles; Associate Professor, University of LaVerne College of
Law.
approach the problem by inquiring whether a given offense is a
general or specific intent crime. This categorization is seen as es-
sential in order to resolve two important questions in criminal liti-
gation, viz., whether evidence of intoxication can be used as a
defense and whether particular jury instructions are appropriate.
In fact, labeling a crime as one involving general or specific intent
does not give a rational answer to either of these practical ques-
tions; it just seems to do so in a majority of cases. More impor-
tantly however, this simplistic labeling approach obscures certain
basic concepts of criminal law that ought to be clearly consid-
ered.'
The purpose of this article is to examine what is meant by the
terms general and specific intent and to demonstrate that their
continued usage is counterproductive. Part I reviews certain ba-
sic principles regarding the concept of intent. Part II will then
consider how the words "general" and "specific" variously serve
to modify the concept. Part III re-examines the common premise
that intoxication is not a defense to general intent crimes, and
Part IV will give fresh consideration to a perennial problem: the
defense of intoxication in cases of assault.
I. THE MEANING OF INTENT
The word "intent" is itself subject to various usages. One defi-
nition makes it a synonym for '"purpose" or "desire." 2 Thus, "the
defendant entered the house with the (intent) (purpose) (desire)
to steal." Used in this manner, the word closely approximates
common understanding.
In many instances, however, the law does not restrict the word
to such a narrow construction. Rather, intent "has often been
viewed as encompassing much of what would ordinarily be de-
scribed as knowledge."'3 Thus one can be said to intend a result
of his act whether he consciously desires the result or simply
knows that it very probably will occur because of his actions. 4
For example, if a discharged airline employee desires to retaliate
against the company by blowing up a plane, he can justly be said
to "intend to kill" if, at the time he explodes the bomb, he has an
1. Note, Intoxication as a Criminal Defense, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1218
(1955) "Categorizing all crimes as either having 'general' or 'specific' intent seems
too mechanical and often forecloses evaluation by the court of the important con-
sideration involved, i.e., what elements are involved in the crime and whether the
prosecution has satisfactorily established them."
2. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 646 (3d ed. 1969); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw
746 (2d ed. 1969) (hereinafter cited as PERKINS).
3. W. LA FAVE & A. ScowT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 197 (1972) (hereinaf-
ter cited as LA FAVE & ScowT).
4. Id. at 196.
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awareness that people are on board who most certainly will per-
ish.5
Furthermore, intent frequently is used in a much wider sense
to describe whatever type of fault or blameworthiness that may
be required for a particular crime. 6 In this sense it is synonymous
with the broad concept of mens rea-a concept referring "not to a
single, definite kind of intent, but rather to a number of different
mental states, all of them involving some blameworthy element."7
Accordingly, intent has been variously used to describe not only
the mental state of knowledge (e.g., that certain goods are stolen),
but of recklessness in behavior (e.g., throwing a rock at the side
of a house which the actor realizes might break a window), and
even negligence. 8
Because crimes generally consist of several elements (i.e., dif-
ferent things that must be proved), a problem of intent (or blame-
worthiness) exists as to each element.9 To illustrate, consider a
larceny statute providing that "every person who takes and car-
ries away the personal property of another with the intent to per-
manently deprive the owner is guilty of theft."lo The elements
that a prosecutor would have to prove are:
1. Taking Control of
2. Personal Property, belonging to
3. Another, and
4. Carrying It Away, with the
5. Intent to Permanently Deprive the Owner.
Initially the intent issue seems clear. The statute itself speaks of
intent in the fifth element. But what about the others? Elements
one and four are physical acts and elements two and three are at-
tendant circumstances which co-exist with these physical acts. A
5. Id. at 197; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Comment, Tent. Draft No. 10,
1960). "The concept of 'intent' has always been an ambiguous one and might be
thought to include results which are believed by the actor to be the inevitable con-
sequences of his conduct."
6. See PERKINS, supra note 2, at 744-45.
7. B. WrrIuN, I CALIFORNIA CRIMES § 52 (1963) (hereinafter cited as WrrKIN).
8. Strictly speaking, negligence (even if of a degree called "gross" or "crimi-
nal") is not a mental state. Nevertheless it is a form of "fault", a factor that crimes
generally require in addition to their physical elements. LA FAVE & Sco2rr, supra
note 3, at 192.
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Comment, Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
10. The quoted "statute" is hypothetical, but it does incorporate the essence of
common law larceny-albeit omitting the element of trespass. See PERKINS, supra
note 2, at 234, 266.
question arises regarding whether any intent (or mental state) is
required as to elements one through four. Guilt would seem to
require that a person must also know he has possession of prop-
erty (element one)" and that it belongs to another (element
three).12 The point here is that with any given offense it is impor-
tant to independently consider whether each element requires
some sort of "intent," and, if so, what sort.13 Some crimes require
no intent (or fault) in reference to certain elements.' 4 In others
the degree of fault may vary with the different elements.' 5 Unfor-
tunately, statutes often do not make explicit what states of mind
are required nor do they delineate with precision the elements
that necessitate a particular mental state.16 These problems
ought to be confronted and resolved during the time of legislative
drafting. 17
II. USE OF THE WORDS "GENERAL" AND "SPECIFIC"
When the words "general" or "specific" are used to modify "in-
tent," it is presumably done to convey a more particularized
meaning. Yet courts rarely define what they mean when they use
such terms. It appears that an assumption is made that attorneys
already know the meanings. But if criminal courtroom experi-
ence is a valid criterion, any such assumption is erroneous. 18 This
is not to suggest that understanding is easily acquired. There ex-
ist several possible definitions for the terms' 9 and, while two defi-
nitions of specific intent predominate, 2 0 confusion remains
because of a continuing unawareness that the terms are definable
in different ways.21
11. LA FAVE & ScoTT, supra note 3, at 196; Perkins, supra note 2, at 900.
12. LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra note 3, at 642.
13. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 9.
14. LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra note 3, at 194.
15. Id. at 194-95.
16. Id.
17. See Remington & Helstad, The Mental Element in Crime-A Legislative
Problem, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 644, 646 (hereinafter cited as Remington and Helstad).
18. Between 1968 and 1975, the author was actively engaged in the trial of
criminal cases. Three and a half years were spent as a deputy public defender and
four years as a deputy district attorney (both for the County of Los Angeles).
During that time he knew that he did not understand the terms and did not meet
anyone who seemed to possess any modicum of true understanding.
19. Professors La Fave and Scott list four variations. LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra
note 3, at 201-02. Their list is not, however, exhaustive of the possibilities. They do
not include the definition discussed in the text at notes 22-24, infra, or the one con-
sidered in note 23, infra. Furthermore, "specific intent" could be used to refer to a
"well-defined intent" (such as the intent in larceny to permanently deprive the
owner of his property)-as distinguished from the unclarified intent implicitly re-
quired in crimes such as rape. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 850 (1978).
20. See text at notes 22-23, infra; see also Remington & Helstad, supra note 17,
at 664.
21. The problem of multiple definitions pervades many areas of the law. See
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The first major usage is the one apparently employed by most
attorneys. This approach considers that the word "specific," when
added to the word "intent," modifies the latter (as used in the
broad sense of mens rea) and narrows its meaning to "purpose"
or "conscious desire."22 Conversely, the use of the word "general"
serves to designate the remaining types of fault that a crime
might require, such as knowledge, 23 recklessness, or negligence. 24
Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. REV. 535, 574 (1954)
"We habitually assume (albeit erroneously) that when language is being used
properly to communicate ideas the same word applied to the same subject matter
ought always to have the same meaning." The crux of the confusion surrounding
the terms general intent and specific intent is that their meanings can differ de-
pending on the reason the terms are used. For example, if one wishes to desig-
nate the mental state of purpose, the term "specific intent" does not (verbally at
least) sound like an unreasonable choice. See text at notes 22-24, infra. If one
wishes to permit the mitigating effect of intoxication to extend only to the mental
states of purpose and knowledge, the term "specific intent" can conveniently be
used to designate just those two mental states. See note 23, infra. Or, if one
wishes to describe a mental state that refers to the future, "specific intent" can
serve that objective as well. See text accompanying notes 29-33, infra. However,
"specific intent" should mean only one thing at one time. Yet often a writer will
use it in one sense but the reader will understand it to mean something else.
Therefore, any coherent use of the term (or of "general intent") must be preceded
by an agreement on its meaning in the particular context. Of course, if it is neces-
sary to define a term each time it is used, it is questionable whether the term
ought to be used at all.
Historically, the specific/general intent distinction evolved as a judicial response
to the intoxicated offender. Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1061 (1947). Professor Fletcher has suggested that much of the
ensuing confusion is due to courts using the terms "as though they had a meaning
beyond their function as devices for seeking a compromise verdict. The difficulty
with taking the term 'specific intent' seriously is that the same term is employed
in a variety of contexts that have nothing to do with intoxication as an excuse." G.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 850 (1978). Fletcher thus views the specific/
general intent distinction as a functional means to "permit evidence of intoxica-
tion to reduce the crime to a lower degree, but not to admit evidence of self-in-
duced intoxication if it would result in a total acquittal." Id. at 848. See also Hall,
Theory and Reform of Criminal Law, 29 HASTINGS LJ. 893, 901-03 (1978).
22. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 9. This distinction is particularly impor-
tant in the law of criminal attempt. Thus it is often said that a person "cannot be
guilty of an attempt to commit murder unless he has a specific intent to kill." Mer-
ritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 661, 180 S.E. 395, 399 (1935). But cf. G. WIL-
LIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw-THE GENERAL PART 49 (2d ed. 1961). "The adjective
'specific' seems to be somewhat pointless, for the intent is no more specific than
any other intent required in criminal law. The most that can be said is that the
intent is specifically referred to in the indictment." Hall, Intoxication and Crimi-
nal Responsibility, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1045, 1064 (1944). "While there are degrees of
concentration or intensity in the response designed 'intentional conduct,' the para-
mount fact is that neither common experience nor psychology knows any such ac-
tual phenomenon as 'general intent' that is distinguishable from 'specific intent."'
23. Some writers, however, use specific intent as meaning both purpose and
Because this definitional distinction is based on a difference be-
tween degrees of fault (i.e., purpose, as opposed to all others), it
is helpful to think of a vertical scale. The word "vertical," as em-
ployed here, suggests an ascending scale of mental culpability
wherein specific intent occupies the top position.
While this predominant usage of specific intent has wide popu-
lar appeal, some ambiguity remains. To the extent that the
residual term "general intent" is used to signify a degree of fault
less than purpose (such as recklessness or negligence), it fails to
indicate the precise kind of fault required. Indeed, at least in Cal-
ifornia, "general intent" has never been accorded a textbook def-
nition,25 though the supreme court has attempted a description.26
Moreover, the word "intent" itself strongly suggests some sort of
goal directed conduct, while "general intent" denotes the oppo-
site.27 It was due to this unmanageably fluid use of the word "in-
tent" that the drafters of the Model Penal Code decided to
abandon the term altogether in favor of clearer terms such as pur-
pose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.28
The other major definition given to the terms general and spe-
cific intent does not seek to separate various degrees or levels of
fault. Rather than approaching intent in a vertical sense, as de-
knowledge. See Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F.J. 1, 9
(hereinafter cited as Paulsen). This usage probably is the most rational, at least
insofar as the term serves as a guide to the admissibility of evidence of intoxica-
tion. See text accompanying note 50, 51 and 72, infra. The line being drawn is be-
tween concrete awareness (purpose and knowledge) and the more attenuated
mental states of fault (recklessness and negligence). It is the lack of the former,
whether due to intoxication or some other cause, which presents the most persua-
sive case for a defense of intoxication. As phrased by Professor Paulsen, "[ilf a
crime (or a degree of crime) requires a showing of [purpose or knowledge] it is
because the conduct involved presents a special danger, if done with purpose or
knowledge or the actor presents a special cause for alarm." Paulsen, supra at 11.
Nevertheless, this use of specific intent is still not satisfactory. It refers collec-
tively to different mental states and does not avoid the ambiguity of "general in-
tent" (discussed in the text at notes 25-27, infra).
24. In the absence of [certain general defenses to crime], general criminal
intent was conclusively presumed from the fact that the actor voluntarily
committed an unlawful act or a lawful act without due care. Moreover, a
person who voluntarily committed an unlawful act was considered to pos-
sess a sufficiently blameworthy state of mind so that he was held liable
even for the purely accidental consequence of his unlawful act.
Remington & Helstad, supra note 17, at 651 (footnote omitted).
25. Comment, Rethinking the Specific-General Intent Doctrine in California
Criminal Law, 63 CALiF. L. REV. 1352, 1356 n.21 (1975).
26. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 456-57, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626
(1969), discussed infra in text accompanying note 29.
27. Cf. Remington & Helstad, supra note 17, at 651 n.22. "Many writers do not
use the term 'general intent' but they nevertheless distinguish between a specific
mental element which must be proved for a particular crime and the general
mental element which is presumed from the defendant's voluntary conduct."
28. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 9.
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scribed above, this second definitional scheme approaches the
problem from a horizontal time perspective. This concept distin-
guishes between intent in reference to the present physical cir-
cumstances and intent in reference to some future situation.29
For example, consider the elements of burglary:3O
1. Entry, into a
2. Building, with the
3. Intent to Commit Theft or a Felony
Under the horizontal approach, burglary would be a specific in-
tent crime because the third element is a state of mind which ex-
ists without connection or reference to the present circumstances
(consisting of the existence of a building and the physical act of
an entry). The state of mind refers, instead, to the future. As
phrased by Professors La Fave and Scott, "the most common us-
age of 'specific intent' is to designate a special mental element
which is required above and beyond any mental state required
with respect to the actus reus of the crime." 31
However, burglary undoubtedly requires that the defendant
also possess a mental state with regard to the first two elements-
i.e., knowledge that he was entering a building.32 If the crime's
definition did not include the third element (intent to steal), the
crime would then be considered one of general intent because,
under the horizontal approach, the required mental state of
knowledge would relate solely to elements involving the actus
reus, that is, the physical conduct of an entry and the attendant
circumstance of a building. Accordingly, a general intent crime is
said to exist "[w] hen the definition of a crime consists of only the
description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a
further act or achieve a future consequence .... [In such a case]
we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act.
This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent."33
29. Note, Intoxication as a Criminal Defense, 55 COLum. L. REV. 1210, 1212
(1955). The California Supreme Court has described specific intent as meaning an
"intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence." People v.
Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 457, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626 (1969).
30. See LA FAVE & Scor, supra note 3, at 708-17.
31. Id. at 202.
32. Id. at 196.
33. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 456-47, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626
(1969) (emphasis added). Cf. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 849 (1978).
"The general intent is the intent accompanying the base offense; the specific in-
tent goes beyond the base offense to reach further unrealized objectives."
Crimes labeled specific intent under the horizontal definition
will also be deemed specific intent crimes under the vertical ap-
proach because the only type of mental state that could be an
"intent to do some further act or achieve some additional conse-
quence" 34 would also, of necessity, have to be the mental state of
"purpose." However, the scope of these two definitional schemes
is not totally co-extensive. There are instances of specific intent
under the vertical approach, but only general intent under the
horizontal approach. 35 While in most cases the designation of a
crime as being one of general intent or specific intent will be the
same regardless of the definitional approach used, the fact that an
occasional difference does occur obviously tends to create confu-
sion.36 Needless to say, this confusion is compounded when the
same court is not consistent in its usage of the terms.37
III. GENERAL INTENT CRIMES AND INTOXICATION
If there were some purpose to be served by these definitional
schemes, then perhaps the effort to understand them would be
worthwhile. Unfortunately, trial decisions which supposedly
hinge on the definitions-admissible evidence of intoxication and
appropriate jury instructions-in reality are not aided by knowl-
34. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 456-57, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626 (1969).
35. An example is the crime of mayhem: "Every person who unlawfully and
maliciously deprives a human being of a member of his body, or disables, disfig-
ures, or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or
slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem." CAL. PENAL CODE § 203 (West
1970). Because the mental state of "maliciously" can be satisfied if the defendant
either desires to cause the particular harm or acts recklessly in reference to the
enumerated injuries, PERKINS, supra note 2, at 186, California cases hold that may-
hem is not a specific intent crime. See People v. Garcia, 5 Cal. App. 3d 15, 18-19, 85
Cal. Rptr 36, 37-38 (1970) (collecting cases). However, for mayhem to support a
conviction of felony-murder, the supreme court has held that the defendant must
have "specifically intended to commit mayhem." People v. Sears, 61 Cal. 2d 737,
744, 401 P.2d 938, 943, 44 Cal. Rptr. 330, 335 (1965). Apparently this means that, in
the felony-murder context, the defendant must be shown to have desired the par-
ticular injury, such as slitting the lip or nose. Id. at 745, 401 P.2d at 943, 44 Cal.
Rptr. at 335. This desire to do the defined injury would indeed be called specific
intent under the traditional (or "vertical") view, as the mental state relates to the
actor's purpose to do the actus reus. See text at notes 22-24, supra. However, it
would be considered general intent under the horizontal approach because the de-
fendant merely desired to commit the proscribed act and "without reference to do
a further act or achieve a further consequence." People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 457,
462, P.2d 370, 378, 83 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626 (1969). See text at notes 29-31, supra.
36. A much more frequent conflict in labels occurs if "specific intent" is some-
times also used to embrace both purpose and knowledge. See note 23, supra.
37. Compare People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 457, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr.
618, 626 (1969) (defining specific intent as involving an intent "to do some further
act or achieve some additional consequence") with People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d
880, 898, 156 P.2d 7, 17 (1945), defining specific intent as an intent which is
"[p Jrecisely formulated or restricted; ... definite, . . . explicit; of an exact or par-
ticular nature" (quoting from WEBSTERS NEW INT'L. DICTIONARY (2d ed.).
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edge of the labels. In this regard let us examine the soundness of
the "rule" that intoxication is not a defense to general intent
crimes, but is a defense to specific intent crimes. 3 8 In the latter
situation intoxication is said to negate the required mental
state.39 Thus, with larceny (a specific intent crime under either
approach),40 evidence of intoxication can be introduced with the
object of negating the intent to steal.41 Accordingly, if an intoxi-
cated man takes property belonging to another because he erro-
neously believes he is the rightful owner, there is not a larceny.4 2
The man simply does not have the required intent to steal (i.e.,
an intent to permanently deprive another of his property). No-
tice, however, that the fact the man is intoxicated is not in itself a
defense. Rather, intoxication is merely evidential on the issue of
the man's true state of mind. 43 The evidence clearly is relevant,
and, as such, is admitted. 4
Is evidence of intoxication any less relevant, or any less admis-
sible, merely because the crime is labeled one of "general intent?"
Consider the crime of receiving stolen property, a crime some-
times thought to be one of general intent.4 5 In its simplest form
the elements are:46
38. Paulsen, supra note 23. Numerous cases to this effect are collected in
Note, Intoxication as a Criminal Defense, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1211-12 (1955).
39. Paulsen, supra note 23, at 10.
40. Larceny requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his prop-
erty. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 266. Since the actor must desire this deprivation,
the mental state is that of purpose, which is the top category on the vertical scale.
See text following note 24, supra. Moreover, since the deprivation must occur, if
at all, in the future, it is specific intent on the horizontal scale. See text accompa-
nying notes 29-31, supra.
41. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 899-900. CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (West 1970) pro-
vides:
No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is
less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But when-
ever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a
necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime,
the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxi-
cated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which
he committed the act.
42. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 265-66.
43. P. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW 332 n.2 (1975).
44. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 (West 1966): "Except as otherwise provided by
statute, all relevant evidence is admissible."
45. See WrrKEN, supra note 7, at § 422. "No specific intent is required."
46. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 322. Note that proof of an honest intent (such as
a desire to return the stolen property to the owner) would eliminate the criminal
aspect of the crime. Id. at 329-30. However, a lack of rightful intent is not an ele-
ment which the prosecutor must allege or affirmatively prove. Id. These princi-
1. Receipt, of
2. Stolen Property, with
3. Knowledge that the property was stolen, and with
4. Wrongful Intent.47
Suppose the property was in fact stolen, but, because of intoxica-
tion, the receiver was under the erroneous belief that it was not.
There is no doubt that in this situation the defense would be al-
lowed. Intoxication clearly is relevant since it tends to negate the
existence of an essential element of the crime-knowledge. 48
Some lawyers would question this, however, asserting that receiv-
ing stolen property is a general intent crime and therefore cannot
be defended by proof of intoxication. But, as this example dem-
onstrates, there is no necessary correlation between crimes la-
beled general intent and the proper admission of evidence of
intoxication as a means to negate a required element. 49
The underlying basis for this established exclusionary "rule" is
that many crimes do not require either purpose or knowledge for
their commission. A good example is battery, where recklessness
will suffice to affix criminal responsibility.5 0 Furthermore, one
ples have been affirmed in California. People v. Osborne, 77 Cal. App. 3d 472, 475-
76, 143 Cal. Rptr. 582, 584-85 (1978).
47. While the crime of receiving stolen property is conveniently thought to
consist of these four elements, the aspect of knowledge is not a separate element
in the crime. Rather, it is an express articulation of the mental state required in
reference to element number two, the attendant circumstance concerning the sta-
tus of the property.
48. People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678 (1866) (intoxication can negate the required
knowledge in a statute prohibiting voting twice); People v. Foster, 19 Cal. App. 3d
649, 655-56, 97 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98-99 (1971) (intoxication can negate the required
knowledge, that the substance possessed was a narcotic).
49. This point occasionally is recognized by the courts.
The People contend that knowledge is not "specific intent." It is true
that knowledge is not identical with intent. [Citations omitted]. It is, nev-
ertheless, a mental state .... Although the crimes involving specific in-
tent provide the usual occasion for the instruction required under Penal
Code section 22 with respect to voluntary intoxication, [.set forth in note
41, supraj that statute is not limited to the existence of specific intent but
by its language includes the existence of any 'particular purpose' or 'mo-
tive' with which a defendant committed the act in question.
Intoxication has obvious relevance to the question of awareness, famili-
arity, understanding and the ability to recognize and comprehend. Ac-
cordingly, it is properly embraced within the concepts of 'purpose' and
'motive' delineated in Penal Code section 22 ....
People v. Foster, 19 Cal. App. 3d 649, 655, 97 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98 (1971). While the re-
sult reached by the court is sound (i.e., the admissibility of evidence of intoxica-
tion to negate knowledge), it is obviously a strained construction to say that
knowledge is somehow synonymous with purpose and motive. It would have been
better to interpret the word "intent" in the statute more broadly so as to encom-
pass the aspect of knowledge.
50. The mens rea for battery is satisfied when the actor desires the infliction of
injury or is merely criminally negligent in reference to the injury. LA FAVE &
Scor, supra note 3, at 605-06. A fortiori, when one is reckless he is also acting
with criminal negligence. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
The term "recklessness" (and its variations) has historically been mired in deft-
76
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who voluntarily becomes intoxicated is deemed to be acting reck-
lessly.5 1 With this type of crime, evidence of intoxication is ex-
cluded, not because it is labeled "general intent," but because the
evidence is simply irrelevant. The crime itself requires no more
than recklessness and the defendant, by his intoxication, satisfies
that requirement.
Is there, then, any sound reason to continue instructing juries
on general and specific intent? Presumably, doing so should
make some difference. However, it is submitted that the only re-
maining reason to retain this practice is to satisfy appellate dic-
tates that it be done.5 2 Since the terms do not clearly delineate
for the jury (or anyone else) what blameworthy state of mind
must exist in any given situation, it would seem senseless to in-
struct a jury in these amorphous terms. It would be much better
simply to tell the jury that, for guilt, a defendant must have
thought about (or have been reckless concerning) certain definite
things. If he did, and also performed the requisite acts, he is to be
nitional uncertainty. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Comment Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955). There are, however, two variables involved: 1) the degree of risk, and 2) the
aspect of awareness. LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra note 2, at 209. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2) (c) defines recklessness as involving both 1) a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk, and 2) an actual awareness of the risk.
51. Paulsen, supra note 23, at 11-15. Most people, however, do not become
truly "reckless" when they drink, whether that term is construed to include an
awareness of risk or merely the creation of a significant risk. "Becoming grossly
intoxicated increases the risk that the actor will do some harm, but the risk, in
most cases, cannot be called substantial." Id. at 13. On the other hand, extreme
intoxication can cause severe impairment of the actor's consciousness of risk. If a
jurisdiction employed a definition of recklessness similar to that of the Model Pe-
nal Code, such a condition could logically constitute a defense in that the required
awareness would be negated. See note 50, supra.
Nevertheless, most American jurisdictions refuse to permit evidence of intoxica-
tion to operate as a defense to crimes for which recklessness suffices. This result
often is explained on the ground that the crime is one of "general intent." The
real reason, however, inheres in the fact that the actor has manifested significant
blameworthiness by voluntarily becoming so drunk that he no longer is conscious
of risk. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Comment, Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Accord-
ingly, the MODEL PENAL CODE provides: "When recklessness establishes an ele-
ment of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a
risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is
immaterial." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2). All of these issues are lucidly dis-
cussed in the Paulson article, supra note 23.
52. See People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 793, 388 P.2d 892, 906, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620,
634 (1964). "As one of the essential elements of robbery is a specific intent to steal
[citations omitted], it follows that it was the trial court's duty in the case at bench
to so instruct the jury even without a request therefore by defendant."
found guilty. If he did not so contemplate and act, he is to be ac-
quitted.
IV. THE CRIME OF ASSAULT AND INTOXICATION
A strong argument can be made that, definitionally, assault is a
specific intent crime. The reasoning would be that since assault is
an attempted battery,53 and attempts as such require a specific in-
tent,54 assault must therefore be a crime of specific intent.5 5 How-
ever, most courts of appeal in California have held that assault is
not a specific intent crime. 56 The problem has been that if intoxi-
cation could negate intent, and if assault were a specific intent
crime, then intoxication would be a possible defense. Since much
assaultive conduct occurs during (and often because of) intoxica-
tion, permitting that same intoxication to exculpate the accused
has always seemed unacceptable. However, if assault were
deemed to be a general intent crime, the problem seemingly
would disappear, given the "rule" that intoxication is not a de-
fense to general intent crimes.
The California Supreme Court directly confronted this dilemma
of semantics and social policy in People v. Hood.57 Chief Justice
Traynor wrote an incisive opinion on the problem of the drunk of-
fender, yet most readers seemed perplexed by the holding.5 8
Bench and bar had anxiously awaited a definitive answer to the
question of whether assault was a general or specific intent crime.
Much to their dismay, however, Hood was not explicit in this re-
gard. If anything, the opinion seemed to suggest that assault
could be either a general or a specific intent crime, depending on
how one wanted to look at it.59
53. WITKIN, supra note 7, at § 255; LA FAVE & Scor, supra note 3, at 609. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1970), provides that "[aIn assault is an unlawful attempt,
coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of an-
other."
54. WrrKI, supra note 7, at § 93; see LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra note 3, at 428-29.
55. WrTKIN, supra note 7, at § 256; G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 851
(1978). The same would be true of crimes wherein assault constitutes a necessar-
ily included offense, such as assault with a deadly weapon.
56. The cases are collected in People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 452-53 n.4, 462 P.2d
370, 379 n.4, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 622-23 n.4 (1969).
57. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr 618 (1969).
58. At least this was the impression of the author who, at the time of the deci-
sion, was a deputy public defender actively engaged in trial work. Some courts,
however, thought they understood. Compare In re C.D.H., 7 Cal. 3d 230, 234, 86
Cal. Rptr. 565, 567 (1970) (assault not a specific intent crime, citing Hood) with
People v. Marceaux, 3 Cal. App. 3d 613, 618, 83 Cal. Rptr. 798, 802 (1970) (assault
requires proof of an intent to commit battery).
59. It is true that in most cases specific intent has come to mean an inten-
tion to do a future act or achieve a particular result, and that assault is
appropriately characterized as a specific intent crime under this definition.
An assault, however, is equally well characterized as a general intent
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Underlying the court's discussion of intent was a search to find
an acceptable manner in which to protect society from violent
conduct. Prior to 1976, aggravated battery in California could be
adequately punished only through crimes defined in terms of as-
sault.60 Consequently, prosecutors were faced with the necessity
of forcing a situation which called for a criminal sanction (reck-
less conduct resulting in injury) into the crime of assault-a
crime that by definition seemed to require purpose and arguably
should be inapplicable when the defendant's activity resulted in
actual physical injury.61 When Hood did not give a definitive la-
bel to the crime of assault, judges and criminal practitioners com-
menced a spirited guessing game on the question of whether the
decision implicitly had suggested the "appropriate" label. After
all, such knowledge was considered essential by those engaged in
the trial of criminal assaults. In fact, Hood had indicated it really
did not matter which label was applied to the crime of assault.62
Thirteen months later a new Chief Justice (Donald Wright) at-
tempted to "clarify" Hood in People v. Rocha.63 This was done by
declaring assault to be a general intent crime.64 All the previous
uncertainty now seemed resolved; evidence of intoxication was
not to be used as a defense to assault crimes 65 and all would
crime under the definition of general intent as an intent merely to do a
violent act.
1 Cal. 3d at 457-58, 462 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
60. Until then, battery was punishable only as a misdemeanor (maximum fine
$1,000 and/or up to six months jail). CAL. PENAL CODE § 243 (West 1970). Only if
the victim was a peace officer or firefighter engaged in the performance of his duty
(and the attacker knew or reasonably should have known that fact) did the crime
become a felony. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17, 243 (West 1970). Simple assaults were
treated similarly, CAL. PENAL CODE § 241 (West 1970), but all assaults with deadly
weapons or by force likely to produce great bodily injury were classed as felonies.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17, 245(a) (West 1970). In 1975, the punishment for battery
was amended to provide for felony treatment when serious bodily injury was in-
flicted upon any person. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243 (West Supp. 1978).
61. The gravamen of an attempt is conduct short of the substantive harm, and
an assault (as an attempted battery) would seem to suggest failure of the in-
tended battery. LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra note 3, at 603. While recent cases tend to
ignore the doctrine of merger and hold that a defendant may be convicted of an
attempt even if the completed crime is proved, id., it is nonetheless clear that one
cannot be convicted of both the attempt and the completed crime. Id. at 603 n.4.
62. "[WJhatever reality the distinction between specific and general intent
may have in other contexts, the difference is chimerical in the case of assault with
a deadly weapon or simple assault." People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d at 458, 462 P.2d at
378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
63. 3 Cal. 3d 893, 479 P.2d 372, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1971).
64. Id. at 899, 479 P.2d at 376-77, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77.
65. Id. at 896, 479 P.2d at 374, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
know which jury instructions were appropriate. 66
There is, however, a problem with the Rocha holding-it is
falacious. 67 In California an assault requires that the actor con-
66. "[Tjhe trial court properly refused to instruct that the jury should con-
sider the effect of intoxication upon Rocha's capability to form the requisite intent
to commit assault with a deadly weapon." Id. at 896-97, 479 P.2d at 375, 92 Cal.
Rptr. at 175.
67. The court initially tried to justify its conclusion by reference to legislative
history. When CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 was enacted in 1872, it provided that "every
person who, with intent to do bodily harm,. . . commits an asssault upon the per-
son of another with a deadly weapon" was guilty of felony. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245
(1872) (amended 1873) (emphasis added). The following year the statute was
amended by, inter alia, omitting the portion referring to intent. 1873 CAL. STAT.
ch. 614, § 22. The court's analysis of this occurrence consisted only of a citation to
People v. Turner, 65 Cal. 540, 4 P. 553 (1884), and the observation that "the court
[in Turner] rejected defense counsel's argument that the 1873 amendment had not
changed the essential elements of the crime and stated that it was unnecessary
for the indictment to charge or the jury to find that the assault was made with the
intent to cause great bodily harm." People v. Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d at 898, 479 P.2d at
376, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 176. The obvious implication was that Turner had held that the
jury need not consider the aspect of intent in cases of assault with a deadly
weapon. But Chief Justice Wright had paraphrased Turner out of context. The
case had not considered the question of the requisite mental state. Rather, the
court in Turner was concerned with a procedural matter, saying that "[ilt is suffi-
cient to follow the language of the statute in charging the offense, and by parity of
reasoning, it is sufficient for the jury to find in the language of the charge." .People
v. Turner, 65 Cal. at 542, 4 P. at 554 (emphasis added). A much more plausible ex-
planation for the 1873 deletion of the intent language would have been that it sim-
ply was surplusage. See text accompanying notes 68-69, infra.
The court in Rocha next acknowledged that People v. Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d at 768,
228 P.2d at 281 (1951), had held that reckless conduct alone could not constitute an
assault. People v. Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d at 898, 479 P.2d at 376, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 176. The
opinion then continued, "It does not follow, however, that assault with a deadly
weapon should be classified as a specific intent crime." Id. Yet the court gave no
explanation why this was so other than to say that "[tIraditionally, simple assault
and assault with a deadly weapon have been referred to as 'general intent'
crimes." Id. at 898-99, 479 P.2d at 376, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 176. Having thus satisfied
itself that "general intent" was the appropriate label for assault, the court then un-
dertook the task of delineating what that general intent was:
An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with the present ability, to
commit a violent injury on the person of another, or in other words, it is
an attempt to commit a battery. [Citations omitted]. Accordingly, the in-
tent for an assault with a deadly weapon is the intent to attempt to com-
mit a battery, a battery being 'any willful and unlawful use of force or
violence upon the person of another.' (Pen. Code, § 242). We conclude
that the criminal intent which is required for assault with a deadly
weapon. . . is the general intent to willfully commit an act the direct, nat-
ural and probable consequences of which if successfully completed would
be the injury to another.
Id. at 899, 479 P.2d at 376-77, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77 (footnote omitted).
Two things should be noted about the court's attempted definition. First, it was
not terribly helpful to say that the required criminal intent consists of a general
intent--especially when the whole purpose of the exposition was to define the
meaning of general intent. Second, the words "if successfully completed" suggest
that the actor must have in mind the idea of a consequential injury at the time he,
for example, swings his fist. One cannot be "successful" at something unless he
aspires to do it. In short, the court's definition of the required general intent for
assault really is a definition of specific intent. See text at notes 68-70, infra.
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template the future and desire that his conduct result in a bat-
tery. 68  Indeed, Rocha itself explicitly recognized this.69
Consequently, there is no conceivable way one can force the ele-
ments of assault into the category of general intent. By whatever
definition one wishes to accord the term "specific intent," it is
clear that assault is, analytically, a specific intent crime.7 0 The
holding in Rocha, then, can probably best be understood as a
common sense concession to the habits of the profession in stead-
fastly attaching unwarranted significance to the labels of specific
and general intent.7 1 If defense lawyers think assault is a general
intent crime they will not be too distressed when their evidence
of intoxication is excluded.7 2
68. "[T]he definition of an assault [is] 'an unlawful attempt, coupled with a
present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.' PENAL CODE
§ 240. One could not very well 'attempt' or try to 'commit' an injury on the person
of another if he had no intent to cause any injury to such other person." People v.
Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 775, 228 P.2d 281, 286 (1951).
69. "A battery must be contemplated, but only an 'injury' as that term is used
with respect to a battery need be intended" (e.g., the least touching would be suffi-
cient). People v. Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d at 899 n.12, 479 P.2d at 377, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 177
(emphasis added).
70. The desire to cause an injury would be specific intent under the vertical
approach (see text accompanying notes 22-24, supra) and the fact that an injury
would be the desired consequence of the assaultive act would make it specific in-
tent under the horizontal approach (see text accompanying notes 29-31, supra). Of
course, the crime of assault could be defined or construed to require only reckless-
ness, as it is in England. R. v. Venna, [19751 3 All E.R. 788 (C.A.). In such a case
voluntary intoxication could itself suffice for the required mens rea. See note 51,
supra. But in R. v. Majewski, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142 (H.L.), the House of Lords
struggled laboriously with concepts such as "basic intent," "specific intent," "spe-
cial intent," "particular intent," and "ulterior intent," only to unanimously con-
clude that self-induced intoxication could not constitute a defense to the crime of
assault. The holding was premised on the familiar rationale that "[iIf man of his
own volition takes a substance which causes him to cast off the restraints of rea-
son and conscience, no wrong is done to him by holding him answerable crimi-
nally for any injury he may do while in that condition." Id. at 150 (per Lord
Elwyn-Jones LC). That being the case, it was unnecessary for the law lords to
have engaged in their extended dissertation on intent. It would have sufficed sim-
ply to say that voluntary intoxication is deemed to constitute recklessness, and, as
such, cannot serve to negate the foresight of consequences otherwise required for
recklessness. See note 51, supra, and 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 14 & 28
(4th ed. 1976) (recklessness postulates foresight of consequence, but intoxication
is not a defense to non-specific intent crimes).
71. Professor Fletcher views Hood and Rocha as the court's effort "to fend off
this argument [of an outright acquittal] and to preserve the principle of compro-
mise verdicts in cases of intoxication." G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
851 (1978).
72. Indeed, it was the need to limit the mitigating effect of intoxication that in-
spired the concept of general intent. Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibil-
ity 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1061-62 (1944). Nevertheless, "[tIhe court's prestige is
But if assault is analytically a specific intent crime, what about
the defense of intoxication? People v. Hood had in fact provided
the answer. The key sentences from the opinion are the follow-
ing:
We need not reconsider our position in Carmen that an assault cannot be
predicated merely on reckless conduct. Even if assault requires an intent
to commit a battery on the victim, it does not follow that the crime is one
in which evidence of intoxication ought to be considered in determining
whether the defendant had that intent. 73 ,
Notice that the court did not overrule or question its holding in
People v. Carmen74 that recklessness was insufficient to support a
conviction for assault. Rather, in Hood, the court held that as a
matter of policy, defendants should not be allowed to use intoxi-
cation as evidence tending to negate the required intention for
assault.7 5 To be found guilty of assault the prosecutor still must
prove that the defendant had the purpose to commit an injury,76
and this proof may be inferred from the defendant's conduct.77
The defendant, of course, may then deny that he had that purpose
and introduce relevant circumstantial evidence tending to support
his claim. However, the defendant may not use the fact of intoxi-
cation in an evidentiary manner to support his claim that he
lacked the purpose.7 8 The reason for this was justified on the fol-
lowing basis:
Alcohol apparently has less effect on the ability to engage in simple goal-
directed behavior, although it may impair the efficiency of that behavior.
In other words, a drunk man is capable of forming an intent to do some-
not enhanced by first announcing [in Hood] that a distinction between general
and specific intent is chimerical and, two years later, resting a decision on that
very dinstinction." Comment, Rethinking the Specific-General Intent Doctrine in
California Criminal Law, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1352, 1363 (1975).
73. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d at 457, 462 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
74. 36 Cal. 2d 768, 228 P.2d 281 (1951).
75. See People v. Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d 893, 897-98, 479 P.2d 372, 375, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172,
175 (1971) (explaining Hood).
76. See notes 68 & 69, supra.
77. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 458 n.7, 462 P.2d 370, 379 n.7, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618,
627 n.7, (1969).
78. Id. "In the crimes of simple assault and assault with a deadly weapon, the
jury may infer from defendant's conduct that he entertained the necessary intent
to commit an injury. Such an inference does not affect the nature of that intent or
determine what significance should be accorded to evidence of intoxication."
(Emphasis added). The idea that the holding in Hood was merely a policy deci-
sion on the admissiblility of evidence of intoxication had been suggested in a pre-
Rocha court of appeal decision. People v. Spence, 3 Cal. App. 3d 599, 605, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 711, 714 (1970). It seemed the only way to reconcile the continuing validity of
the Carmen decision. (See note 68, supra). Since Carmen apparently remains
good law (see note 72, supra), it is interesting that the court in Rocha disapproved
Spence "to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion [Rocha]." 3 Cal. 3d at
899 n.8, 479 P.2d at 376 n.8, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 176 n.8. Perhaps Spence incurred disfa-
vor because it flirted obliquely with the possiblility that, given Carmen, assault
might be a "specific intent" crime after all! 3 Cal. App. 3d at 605-06, 83 Cal. Rptr. at
714.
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thing simple, such as strike another, unless he is so drunk that he has
reached the stage of unconsciousness. What he is not as capable as a so-
ber man of doing is exercising judgment about the social consequences of
his acts or controlling his impulses toward anti-social acts. He is more
likely to act rashly and impulsively and to be susceptible to passion and
anger. It would therefore be anomalous to allow evidence of intoxication
to relieve a man of responsibility for the crimes of assault with a deadly
weapon or simple assault which are so frequently committed in just such
a manner.
7 9
To summarize, it is submitted that People v. Hood stands for
the following proposition: while assault really is a "specific in-
tent" crime (for whatever meaning one may take that label to
have), it consists of behavior which commonly occurs when peo-
ple are intoxicated; most intoxicated persons (unless uncon-
scious) are able to form the requisite intent to cause injury to
another; therefore, one who is intoxicated and performs assault-
ive behavior should not be allowed to escape criminal responsibil-
ity by claiming that he was drunk and did not know what he was
doing. As for the rare defendant who in fact lacked the requisite
intention due to intoxication, he is told that his right to present
such evidence will be sacrificed for the greater good of preventing
specious claims by others. Although he still may claim that he
lacked the intent necessary to commit an assault (i.e., the desire
to commit a battery), the court will prevent him from supporting
that claim with evidence of his intoxicated condition.8 0 In short,
the defendant finds himself in this predicament because of his
79. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 458, 462 P.2d 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627 (1969).
80. This would be true even if the defendant, due to voluntary intoxication, be-
came unconscious. Paulsen, supra note 23. Cf. People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 575,
268 P.2d 705, 720 (1954) "[A] lthough voluntary intoxication may at times amount to
unconsciousness, yet it can only have the effect of negating specific intent. .. ."
(opinion by Traynor, J.). Baker involved a homicide. The court indicated that, to
the extent the defendant's unconsciousness was based upon his voluntary intoxi-
cation, the intoxication would constitute only a "partial defense." Id. However,
unconsciousness produced by voluntary intoxication would not constitute any de-
fense to crimes of assault, because in assault cases intoxication is not even a par-
tial defense. The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently reconsidered the
problem of the intoxicated offender and concluded that, with minor exception, vol-
untary intoxication should not be a defense to any crime-whether specific or gen-
eral. State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467, 472, 396 A.2d 1129, 1134 (1979). The exceptions
include premeditation in murder cases, establishing a fixed state of insanity, dem-
onstrating mistake (if relevant), and showing that the defendant was comotose
and thus unable to commit the act. Id. at 474, 396 A.2d at 1136. California, how-
ever, recognizes a distinction between the mental aspect of merely assaultive be-
havior and that involved in other crimes: "The difference in mental activity
between formulating an intent to commit battery and formulating an intent to
commit a battery for the purpose of raping or killing may be slight, but it is suffi-
cient to justify drawing a line between them and considering evidence of intoxica-
blameworthy decision to become intoxicated, a decision which
precludes his assertion of an otherwise valid defense.81
CONCLUSION
The terms "general" and "specific intent" remain, in widespread
use but are the source of continuing confusion and uncertainty in
the area of criminal law. They are defined differently at different
times, and they tend to hinder clear understanding of the ele-
ments of crimes. These terms distort analysis involving the ad-
missibility of evidence, and fail to serve any rational purpose.
While much greater clarity would be achieved by using the words
proposed by the Model Penal Code, it is doubtful whether the
criminal law will ever be totally free from these deeply rooted
terms.
Neverthless, any future use of the terms should not extend be-
yond that of merely differentiating two vague classes of crime.
Certainly the particular label attached to a crime should not, in
and of itself, determine questions of admissible evidence. While
intoxication often is not relevant in defense of crimes labeled as
general intent, there are situations where the exclusion of such
evidence would be obvious error. Consequently, continued reli-
ance of the "rule" that intoxication cannot negate a general intent
crime is misplaced. However, even though assault is definition-
ally a specific intent crime, policy reasons dictate that evidence of
intoxication should not be admitted as a defense, at least in situa-
tions where the crime of assault exists as the only realistic charge
available to the prosecutor.
tion in the one case and disregarding it in the other." People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444,
458, 462 P.2d 370, 374, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627 (1969).
81. See Paulsen, supra note 23 at 5: '°Trough a choice, of the sort normally
operative in the law, the inebriate has increased the risk of harm to others by re-
ducing his own capacity for taking dangers into account and for controlling him-
self. It would be incongruous if an election of that sort would exculpate."
